The October 1973 War
The October 1973 war is the fiercest and most powerful war Egypt has ever waged against Israel after its treachery in the Six-Day War
After the setback, failure and military corruption at the time, the Egyptian military realized the importance of retrieving the stolen land and began to plan for that. Egypt began the war of attrition that exhausted the enemy and was seized by the fighting of the righteous martyrs of Egypt and the lightning forces
After the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the Egyptian side and the Israeli side in the Sinai, the Egyptian leadership and the armed forces began the final planning of the October glorious war, which was planned by the General Staff, headed by General Saad al-Din al-Shazli, head of the General Staff,
The October War Majid is the biggest war ever carried out on the battlefield after the Second World War. The balance of power and the management of joint gun battles have been turned upside down and these concepts and rules have been re-structured. Lessons learned from this war are that the October War
The Egyptian army fought the first battles of the war with the enemy in Sinai, where the Egyptian military laid out the greatest and greatest features of the military fighting with joint weapons and sacrificed during its battles many martyrs and leaders of Egypt with their lives in order to liberate the land
The October 1973 war and the theater of operations carried out the largest air battle lasting more than 53 minutes in a close air fight. The October War marked the biggest battle of armor after World War II
(Some complete information on preparing for war after a setback 67)
War of 5 June 1967 (setback)
- Following the political escalation of the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the news of Israeli crowds on the Syrian border through the Soviet Union, which resulted in the effect that Nasser mobilized the Egyptian army in Sinai and deported the international forces (the emergency forces) from the border With Israel and closed the navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.
On June 5, 1967, the Israeli air force launched air strikes against Egypt - Syria - Jordan following its false declaration of being attacked by Arab forces.
The sudden strategic impact of the Israeli strike on the Arab armies was the huge losses and confusion among the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces, which resulted in the wrong orders of the military leaders, especially the Egyptian, which led to the martyrdom of more than 20,000 soldiers in Sinai
The Egyptian Air Force lost 85%, the Egyptian army lost 80% of its military training, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights, the expulsion of Jordanian forces from the West Bank, and the seizure of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
- Of course, such defeat has affected the peoples of the defeated countries and their leadership. The most prominent of which is the withdrawal of President Abdel Nasser from the post and return to him after the popular demonstrations that swept Egypt and the Arab countries, demanding his return
As it ended, the suicide of Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and the trial of Shams Badran and warlord.
- It was natural to make radical changes in the Egyptian military leaders after the trial of those responsible for the defeat. The team took over Mohammed Fawzi, chief of staff before the defeat of the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces after the defeat and took over the team Abdel Moneim Riyad chief of staff.
- The Egyptian army after the defeat of June in the event of a collapse of psychological and military and moral, which made the military commanders form committees to study the military situation of the Egyptian army and the survivors of that crisis through a series of successful military operations in the aftermath of the defeat and
Battle of the head of the nest
And the dumping of the destroyer Eilat near the shore of Port Said, which was the beginning of the war of attrition against the Israeli forces and lasted for three years until 1970 was the signing of the Rogers cease-fire initiative.
- After the defeat, President Nasser ordered the Armed Forces Operations Committee, headed by General Abdel Moneim Riad, to develop a sugar plan to liberate Sinai and reach the Egyptian-Palestinian borders so that this victory could be exploited politically for the benefit of the Palestinian people.
- Here formed committees within the operating rooms of the armed forces, which continued its work for a month produced the first plan for the liberation of Sinai, the plan 200.
· Plan 200 and recover Sinai: -
- The plan consists of two phases of two phases and this plan comes out of phase plans and operational plans and these plans are implemented in the form of joint operations project.
1- The first stage (operation granite): -
This stage is the crossing of the Egyptian forces to the Suez Canal and the storming of the Barlev line and the seizure of its fortifications and access to the area of strategic mountain fjords.
2- Second stage:
The Egyptian forces advance from the mountain foothills in an offensive operation to reach the Egyptian-Palestinian border, thus achieving the final purpose of the plan.
The opinion of the Egyptian military leaders in the plan 200
- Team Mohamed Fawzi: -
Fawzi explained that after three years, the Egyptian Armed Forces had the ability, the military potential and the high morale to fight the liberation war, and the selection of field formations for this and all branches of the General Command was completed.
Fawzi also said that he mentioned the willingness of the armed forces to fight the liberation war of President Abdel Nasser that he got verbal approval from him during the meeting of Marsa Matrouh in August 1970 and that it was agreed on the date of November 7, 1901 after the end of Rogers initiative as a deadline to start the attack.
Team plan Mohamed Sadiq: -
1 - Crossing the Suez Canal and overcome all difficulties that block or disrupt the transit process.
2 - Only in the face of the fortified points in the Barlev line on those that affect the infiltration plan and the wings of the forces in transit.
3 - Drop parachutes, stunts and air raid forces over the straits to hold them until the arrival of armored forces and infantry supported them and at the same time prevent the tactical reserves of the enemy located in the depth of the intervention in the battle.
4 - Groups of armored forces and mechanized infantry to the three straits to join the forces that were justified in the straits.
5 - The heads of the bridges are based on the channel and hide behind the defensive line based on the straits.
6. Transfer of air defense missile batteries to the east of the Canal to protect the ground forces from hostile attacks as well as self-propelled air defense units, bearing in mind that all forces will be under the umbrella of the air force.
7. 100 long-range fighter launchers are sufficient to protect the Egyptian forces until they reach the straits.
- But the plan of the team Mohammed Sadiq was difficult to put into force at that time because of the need for the plan to weapons and equipment were not available in the Egyptian army and also difficult to get from the Soviet and training because it will take years.
Plan of high minarets (Saad Al-Din Al-Shazly):
- The plan of the team Saad al-Din al-Shazli "minarets high" is the first real plan offensive placed on the existing capabilities of the armed forces, and is dependent on crossing the Suez Canal and the destruction of the Barlev line and the establishment of head bridges at the depth of the channel from 10 to 12 kilometers.
- The limitation of the offensive plan to that military objective is due, among other reasons:
1- The weakness of the air force and its inability to protect the land forces as it progresses east of the canal towards the area of the straits.
2. The absence of SAM (6) air defense units that can accompany ground forces as they advance eastward to repel hostile air attacks that attack ground forces on medium and high altitudes.
3 - the lack of vehicles with tracks to the ground forces in sufficient numbers that allow our forces to adhere to the paved roads while moving east.
Plan Granite 2 (modified as Badr): -
- After taking over the Ministry of War and the General Command of the Armed Forces, the team Saad Al-Shazly presented the plans Granit 2, which aims to reach the straits and the plan of minarets high, which aims to build the heads of bridges at a depth of 10 to 12 kilometers east of Suez Canal.
- Team Ahmed Ismail was convinced that the armed forces were unable to implement Plan 2 Granite and settled on the plan of high minarets and determined the spring of 1973 as a possible date of attack.
- On 10 January 1973, the Council of the Union of Arab Republics was adopted by appointing General Ahmed Ismail as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Forces. Immediately after the appointment and appointment of Major General Bahi El-Din Nofal as Head of the Federal Operations Authority, this leadership began its work in planning an offensive operation including the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. One timing.
- As a result of the study of the strategic situation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, the thinking of the team Ahmed Ismail on the plan of minarets high where he felt it is necessary to modify the plan to include the seizure of the strategic straits line in Sinai as 45-55 east of the Suez Canal.
This is because the conditions of the Syrian front geographically and strategically imposed that the purpose of the Syrian attack was to liberate the Golan Heights in full.
And the Golan Heights at a depth of no more than 25 km in the widest area and abandoned any natural or industrial barriers, making the battlefield connected with Israel.
- The success of the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights means the arrival of the Syrian armored forces to the Jordan River, which is not separated from the major Israeli ports in the north, 50 km, which the armored vehicles can cut in a few hours.
- Because the strategic situation on the Egyptian front did not constitute for Israel an urgent danger to the centers of population density in the south because of the existence of natural barriers and the Sinai Desert about 225 km and the Negev desert so it was expected when the war began to receive the Israeli forces weighed on me The Syrian front provides an opportunity for the Egyptian forces to develop the attack eastward and seize the corridors.
- So Ahmed Ismailab ordered the amendment of the Egyptian plan to suit Syrian plans and objectives.
The operation was headed by Major General Abdul Ghani Al-Jamsi, with the preparation of a plan of operations other than the plan of the high minarets, including the development of the attack east after crossing to reach the straits. The new plan was the plan Granite 2 with some modifications. September to be the Badr Plan.
Thus, the transit plan and the construction of the bridge heads were called the first phase, while the development plan east to reach the straits was called the second stage.
The October 1973 War
- It has been a long time for the military leaders, politicians and the people and they are preparing to meet the Israeli enemy and expelled from the Sinai, it was necessary to prepare a complete kit for this war, where only the victory or the collapse of Egypt for good.
- So the military leadership began preparing the Egyptian armed forces as follows:
- Theater processing: -
- The Egyptian forces began to implement the plan to equip the theater of operations after the June 1967 war, especially after the terrible defeat suffered by the Egyptian forces and the arrival of Egyptian forces to the east coast of the Suez Canal.
- The Egyptian armed forces concentrated their efforts and energies on exploiting the capacities of civil companies from the private sector and the public sector. They carried out huge work in all the Egyptian territories, where fortifications were set up for the protection of individuals, weapons, equipment and ammunition, digging trenches and firebases for the main artillery, temporary and structural interchange, And the control of the main exchange of all levels and the establishment and elevation of the western berms of the channel and the establishment of hills on the governor of the embankment for the occupation of tanks and anti-tank weapons were also created strong points in the trends of special importance and Establishment of anti-aircraft missile network.
- In order to avoid what happened in the defeat of June 1967, reinforced concrete shelters and planes were built for aircraft and technical equipment in the air bases and airports. They were provided with steel gates, 20 new bases and airports and engineering units at each airport to maintain and repair the corridors once they were bombed.
- Provide the infantry with special equipment and support weapons commensurate with the problem of crossing the Suez Canal after the field strength (Albl), which was in force in the armed forces does not fit the new circumstances.
Transit process
After the military leaders agreed to implement the Badr Plan according to the strategic direction, the Egyptian forces were mobilized according to the following conditions:
1. The first format
Was formed from the Red Sea military area and the second and third armies in the field
The Red Sea Military Area:
Leadership: Major General Ibrahim Kamel
Formation: - First format and reserve consists of the first format of two independent infantry brigades except
The battalion and reserve consists of a infantry battalion.
B - Third Field Army: -
Leadership: Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel.
Formation: - Two levels and a reserve.
* - The first format: -
On the right, the 19 Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Yusuf Afifi, with the 22nd Armored Brigade of the 6th Mechanic Division
On the left, the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi, with 25 armored brigades.
* - Second format:
- The 4th Armored Division led by Brigadier General Mohammed Abdul Aziz Qabeel and the 6th Mechanic Infantry Brigade, except for a brigade led by Brigadier General Muhammad Abu Al Fath Muharram.
* - Reserve:
- A lightning group, a regional brigade, a Border Police regiment and a Palestinian lightning brigade
The Second Field Army:
Leadership: Major General Saad Maamoun.
Formation: - Two levels and a reserve.
* - First theme:
- On the right, the 16th Infantry Division, led by Brigadier General Abdul Rabi Al-Nabi Hafez, with the 14th Armored Brigade of the 21st Armored Division.
In the center, the 2nd Division was led by Brigadier General Hassan Abu Saada, along with Major General 24 Armored Corps of the 23rd Infantry Division
On the left, the band is led by Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali, with 15 armored brigades.
- Port Said District 2, an independent traffic brigade led by Major General Omar Khalid.
* - Second format:
- The 21st Armored Division, except for a brigade led by Brigadier General Ibrahim Al-Orabi.
* - Reserve:
- The 23rd Infantry Division is a mechanic, except for the brigade commander of Major General Ahmed Aboud Al-Zomor
Major General 10 mechanical scenes from the third band mechanical sight.
2. General Command Reserve:
The 3rd Infantry Division consists of a mechanic other than a brigade commanded by Brigadier General Mohammad Najati, two independent artillery brigades, a paratroop brigade and two air-raid brigades, except for the Saybah Group Battalion.
On October 6, crossing the Suez Canal, the Barlev line was destroyed
- At 2 pm on October 6, 1973 the Egyptian Air Force launched a strike centered on the targets of the count and in the depth of the Sinai and the fortresses of the Barlev line through more than 200 Egyptian aircraft from the fighter jets Mgg 17 and Sukhoi 7, which resulted in the following results: -
1. The Miles, Bertmada and Ras Nasrani airports were turned into wreckage.
2. Destruction of 10 Hawk surface-to-air missile sites.
3. Destruction of six long-range artillery sites.
4 - the destruction of three radar sites and guidance and warning centers.
5 - Umm Khashib and Umm Qasem Displacement Stations were destroyed.
6. Destruction of three administrative areas of the enemy.
7 - Bombing the strong point east of Port Fouad (Budapest).
Five minutes later, more than 2,000 artillery pieces and mortars were carried out with a tactical missile brigade. The ground bombarded a center for 53 minutes. It produced a Nirani boot, one of the most powerful pre-firing operations in history, planned by the commander of the artillery, Mohammed Al-Mahi. Artillery and several hundred artillery direct hit Brigadier General Mohammed Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala Commander of the Second Army artillery and Brigadier General Munirashash commander of the Third Army artillery
- After the start of the boot, the crossing of the Suez Canal tankers through rubber boats began to destroy the enemy tanks and prevent them from interfering in the operations of the main forces and preventing them from using their terraces with dirt on the east bank of the canal.
- At twenty-two minutes the artillery had completed the first one, which lasted 15 minutes and focused on all the hostile targets on the eastern shore of the channel to a depth of between a kilometer and a half
At the time when the second artillery was raised at a depth of 1.5 km to 3 km from the eastern shore, the first waves of the first phase of the first infantry battalions began to arrive in wooden and rubber boats at the intervals of fortified points.
- With the initial wave flow of the marine radars into two units of the 130 Infantry Brigade Independent Mechanic, each consisting of a reinforced mechanized battalion, through the Lesser Lakes lake, with the aim of rushing eastward and taking the entrance of the Capricorn Strait and the Metla Strait in cooperation with the Air Force Helicopters will be concocted behind enemy lines
With the flow of the crossings at 15 minutes per wave and until 4:30 pm, eight waves of infantry crossed. The Egyptian forces on the eastern shore of the canal have five bridgeheads each with a length of 6 km and a depth of 2 km each.
At the same time as the infantry crossed, the engineering forces were opening holes in the barbed wire of the Barlev line by running water pumps and removing tons of cubic meters of sand.
- When the gaps were opened, the bridge units lowered and installed them in 6-9 hours until all the heavy, light, structural and amphibious transporters were installed.
During the darkness, the crossing was completed until 80,000 infantry fighters, 800 tanks, armored vehicles and hundreds of guns were completed.
The role of the Egyptian Navy
- The Egyptian Navy shelled the shores of Israel in the process of pre-emptive fire.
- They shelled the fortified point in Port Fouad through the coastal artillery in Port Said and the fortified spot at Kilo 10 south of Port Fouad. The coastal artillery shelled the hostile targets of the Third Army in the Gulf of Suez.
- The rocket launchers shelled enemy concentrations in Rumana and Ras Biron on the Mediterranean coast and also on the Gulf of Suez attacked the enemy's vital targets in Ras Masala and Ras Sidr
- The human frogs attacked the oil area of Bila'im and the minefields blocked navigation at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez by laying mines.
- The Egyptian naval forces cut the shipping in the Israeli ports on the Mediterranean Sea by 100% and in the Red Sea by 80%
We have lost 5 aircraft, 20 tanks and 280 martyrs, representing 2 and a half percent of aircraft, 2 percent in tanks and 3 percent in men, which is a small loss for the numbers involved in the fighting.
At the same time, the enemy lost 25 aircraft, 120 tanks and hundreds of dead with the loss of the battles it fought. The Barlev line, which represented security and immunity to Israel, and the defeat of the Israeli army, which they claimed was irreversible, fell from 15 fortifications, It lost its military value after half the number of fortresses fell and about 100 tanks representing one-third of their tanks fighting in the front line were lost.
Two armored brigades moved to Sinai on October 7. One of them, under the command of General Abraham, condemned the north axis in the direction of Qantara and the other division led by General Ariel Sharon on the central axis in the direction of Ismailia, in addition to an armored battalion that had been on the front since the beginning of the war, About 950 front-mounted tanks were deployed in three armored divisions under the command of three senior IDF commanders.
While the Israeli reserve was mobilized on October 7 (the Adan Brigade and the Sharon Squadron), Dian flew to the Southern Command of Sinai, where he reviewed the situation with its commander, General Johnin.
There is no doubt that Diane is fully aware of the deteriorating situation on the front and the losses suffered by the armored division led by Mendler, whose losses amounted to 200 tanks or two thirds of the number of his tank and the loss of the effectiveness of the fortresses of the Barlev line and the failure to rescue the trapped Israeli personnel.
Battle of Qantara East
The fortifications built by the enemy in the Qantara sector were one of the strongest fortifications of the Barlev line. They reached seven fortifications, and fighting within the civilian population required an effort as fighting in cities differed from fighting in the desert.
And continued the night of 7/8 October, using white weapons to cleanse the city of Israeli soldiers and enabled the division 18 under the command of Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali at the end of October 7 from the siege of the city and control in preparation for liberation.
On Monday, October 8, the 18th Infantry Division led by Brigadier General Fuad Aziz Ghali was able to liberate the city of Qantara Sharq after it was besieged internally and externally and then raided it. The fighting took place in its streets and buildings until the enemy forces collapsed. The group captured a number of weapons and enemy equipment, The tanks and the capture of thirty members of the enemy are all who remained in the city and broadcast at nine thirty in the evening of October 8 from Radio Cairo Liberation City, which had a good impact in the hearts of everyone
Battle of the eyes of Moses
In the third sector of the army, the forces were fighting at a depth of 8 to 11 kilometers east of the canal. The most prominent battle of the day was the success of the 19 Infantry Division led by Brigadier General Yosef Afifi in occupying the fortified Israeli positions on the east bank where six 155 mm guns are stationed.
The Israeli enemy used these cannons to bomb the city of Suez during the war of attrition, and we were unable to silence them at that time, despite the firing of firefighters against them with all kinds of artillery duds available at that time for the hardness of the fortifications that were carried out by the Israeli forces.
Battle of Alfardan
The enemy re-organized its forces and tried to condemn - the Abraham Adan brigade consisting of three armored brigades about 300 tanks - again the attack by two armored brigades against the Hassan Abu Saada Brigade and the 3rd Brigade against the 16th Brigade under the command of Brigadier Abdul Rab al-Nabi in the Sector of East Ismailia (the Second Army) Between the Adan band and the Hassan Abu Saada band.
Operation Nickel Grass: (American Air Bridge)
- After the sudden collapse of Israel in the 1973 war and the continuation of the fighting for 6 days, the Israeli losses in armored vehicles, aircraft and individuals were countless, in addition to the fall of the Barlev line in the hands of the Egyptians and their capture and the liberation of some Egyptian cities in the Sinai.
- Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir sent a distress call to the American president, the most important phrase, "Save us from the Egyptian flood."
- Immediately the American allies moved and established an air bridge to compensate the Israeli army for what it lost in the war of planes, tanks and the like since 10 October on an unofficial basis.
Since October 13, it has officially called Operation Nickle Grass and used the C-5 and C-141 planes. Israel did not charge the seven Jumbo aircraft to El Al to transport its weapons and equipment. Therefore, attempts were made to lease American civilian aircraft for the speed of transport, Aviation refused to cooperate for fear of Arab boycott.
Development of the attack east "October 14"
After the end of the planned period of operations from 6-9 October and the arrival of the field armies to the line of their immediate tasks, an operational operational pause was held from 10 - 15 October.
But during the tactical pause, the situation on the Syrian front was very alarming, and orders were issued to develop the attack eastward. To drive the enemy west of the mountain passes and limit the freedom of movement while at the same time putting pressure on the Syrian front.
The plan for this development was that the 21nd Armored Division and the 4th Armored Division east of the Canal, except for a brigade with a hundred tanks remaining west of the canal.
On October 13, Israel received full information about the forces east of the canal and west of the canal and the size of the development forces and the direction of the main axis. The Egyptian air force penetrated, as it was described as an American-style aircraft SR-71, a strategic reconnaissance aircraft that can take several pictures through advanced means A 25-km high and three times the speed of sound that any Egyptian air force fighter can not chase.
On the morning of October 14, the attack began to develop eastward at 6.15 am with Egyptian artillery shelling and Egyptian forces launched their targets.
But the advance knowledge of the Israeli forces of the attack and the size of its forces made them sign many losses in the Egyptian tanks and reached 250 tanks of the main attack forces. Thus, the development forces were forced to return to the heads of the five bridges of the five and the failure of the development eastward.
The gap October 16-21
The operation was assigned to Ariel Sharon, commander of the 143 Armored Operations Group, which later supported an umbrella brigade.
Crossing the two armored units 21, 4 to the east of the channel to participate in the development of an attack to the east dropped all the objections facing the Israeli leadership in the implementation of the process of Ghazala crossing the west of the canal.
The aim of the Israeli army's crossing from east to west was to hit SAM anti-aircraft batteries, occupy the city of Ismailia, encircle the Second Army, occupy the city of Suez and encircle the Third Army.
Sharon's crossing to the west of the canal was the key to both Avraham Adan and Kellman Magen crossing their forces on the bridges set up by Sharon and implementing the plan of Operation al-Ghazal. But Sharon's failure to occupy Ismailia, Abraham Adan and Kalman Majan in the Suez occupation and encirclement of the Third Army.
Meanwhile, on October 21, 1973, the UN Security Council passed resolution 338 on the ceasefire. Israel and Egypt accepted the resolution as of October 22, 1973, when UN Security Council Resolution 338 stopped the fighting as of sunset on 22 October.
Israel was aware that it did not achieve a political goal or a strategic military objective, for failing to force us to withdraw our dead in the east and west of the Canal .....
Therefore, Israel has decided to make a great effort to achieve some political or military gains before it complies with the cease-fire. To that end, Israel has made a major effort to achieve some political or military gains before it complies with the cease-fire.
Israel sent new troops to the west of the canal on the night of 22/23 and on the night of 23-24 October to reinforce its forces in the area of Debsarwar.
It continued its fighting and advanced its forces southward to reach the rear of the Third Army to cut the Suez-Suez desert road and seize the city of Suez. On October 23, the Security Council adopted resolution 339 to reinforce the previous resolution. Both Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire on the morning of ... .
In spite of Israel's commitment to Resolution 339, Mohammed Abdel Ghani Al-Jamsi, head of operations for the Egyptian army, mentions the October 1973 war in his memoirs. However, the army left its military free of military action in the hope of occupying the city of Suez, thus achieving a political objective with great political, military and media influence. But Israel 's attempts failed to occupy the city of Suez on 24 and 25 October, although it succeeded in cutting the road of Egypt, Suez desert
The fighting stopped on 28 October with the arrival of United Nations forces in the fighting zone.
Statement of the General Command (from the memoirs of the head of the Operations Directorate of the October War Brigade Mohammed Abdul Ghani Jassmi)
The General Command issued a military statement summarizing the military situation on the morning of October 24, 1973, in which we explained:
- Our forces in the Sinai occupies the eastern shore of the Suez Canal from Port Fouad north to the length of 200 km and a depth ranging from 12 to 17 km along the front, including the city of Qantara East, except for a small gap of Debsarwar north of seven kilometers adjacent to the bitter lakes and the area controlled Our forces east of the canal (Sinai) 3000 square kilometers.
- There are no enemy forces at all in any of the main Suez Canal cities, Ismailia, Port Said.
- There are some enemy units scattered and interconnected between our forces prevent him from the implementation of its objectives.
- Supply to all our forces east of the canal continues on a regular basis and did not stop for a moment
This situation continued until the end of the war, when the Israeli forces failed to enter the city of Suez, and then the war stopped the arrival of the international forces on October 28, 1973
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